Archive for the ‘court’ Category
Wednesday, January 12th, 2011
Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a creditor friendly decision in the case of Ransom v. Fia Card Services. At issues was the "ownership expense" deduction in the means test.
The means test is a calculation used to determine whether a debtor has enough "disposable income" to afford a Chapter 13 repayment plan.
In the Ransom case, the debtor (Jason Ransom) claimed a means test deduction for both operation of a vehicle ($338 per month) and for ownership ($471 per month). The problem – Mr. Ransom owned his vehicle free and clear.
In an 8-1 decision written by Obama appointee Elena Kagan (the lone dissent issued by conservative Justice Scalia), the Supreme Court held that a debtor who owns his vehicle free and clear can only claim a deduction for vehicle operation but not a deduction for ownership.
In Mr. Ransom's case, this means that for bankruptcy calculation purposes, he has an extra $471 sitting around that he can use to pay credit card companies in a Chapter 13.
At first blush, the Supreme Court's decision would seem to make sense – why should a debtor get to claim an ownership deduction if he does not have a car payment?
Here is the issue: Chapter 13 cases last 5 years. Assuming that Mr. Ransom has a paid off car, it is likely that his car is not new. What happens when Mr. Ransom needs to replace his car? He will have no funds to do so because any funds that he might have left over are being used to fund his Chapter 13.
Further, the means test budget is derived from IRS numbers that are used in tax settlement cases. These means test budgets are a little better than a "rice and beans" budget but there is very little else. Is it reasonable to expect that a debtor will have no emergencies during the next five years – a funeral to attend? a roof to fix? a major car repair?
The Supreme Court's decision ignores the realities of life. In the immediate near term the debtor may have $471 to pay towards his Chapter 13, but is it reasonable to expect that this "disposable" money will be there month after month? The Chapter 13 trustee will expect it, and these funds will come out in a payroll deduction. But I fear that even more Chapter 13 cases will fail when debtors lose their jobs because they do not have transportation or checks for mortgages will bounce because the funds were used for plumbing repairs or other emergencies.
The Ransom decision also sends a very strange message to debtors entering the bankruptcy process. Instead of encouraging people to avoid debt, the Ransom decision encourages filers to incur more debt prior to filing. In this upside down logic, a debtor would benefit from taking out a car title loan prior to bankruptcy since having debt owned on a car will allow that debtor to claim an ownership expense.
Creditors like credit card companies are concerned about getting as much as they can as quickly as they can, and such an position makes sense in a business context. But who loses when court supervised repayment plans (Chapter 13) are doomed to fail because there are no accommodations for emergencies or other likely needs during a looming 5 year time span.
Posted in 13, Bankruptcy budgets, Creditor, Filers, Means Test issues, Obama, Ransom, Ransom v. Fia Card Services, a, afford, appointee, automobile operation expense, automobile ownership expense, card, case, chapter, court, decision, dissent, elena, emergencies the, encourages, fia, friendly, issued, kagan, lone, means test budgets, month, mr, owned, ownership in, plan in, problem, repayment, services , supreme, the, u s, v, yesterday, | Comments Off
Wednesday, July 14th, 2010
The United States Supreme Court rarely accepts cases that affect consumer bankruptcy debtors. Recently, however, the Court considered an issue that potentially impacts all debtors – the treatment of exemptions.
The term "exemptions" refers to property you own that is protected from the reach of the trustee or creditors. For example, every state provides for exemptions that include your clothes, a certain amount of household goods, a certain amount of equity your car, and a certain amount of equity in your home. Georgia has fairly stingy exemptions – you can read the Georgia exemption law by clicking on the link.
When property is declared as exempt, it does not count for purposes of counting up your assets. If you own property that exceeds the exemption available to you, that property could be seized and sold by a Chapter 7 trustee or it could force you to pay back a higher percentage of your unsecured debt in a Chapter 13. Exemption planning and exemption calculation are important functions for consumer bankruptcy lawyers.
The Supreme Court decision in Schwab v. Reilly requires debtors and their attorneys to be more exact when identifying exemptions, and applies to cases filed in Georgia and everywhere else in the United States. The article that follows is a guest post written for this blog by Brandon Moreno, Vice President of the Utah Bankruptcy Hotline. The Utah Bankruptcy Hotline maintains a network of unaffiliated Utah bankruptcy lawyers who provide debt relief and bankruptcy counsel to consumers in Utah.
On June 17, in Schwab v. Reilly, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision that limits the extent to which individuals filing under Chapter 7 can exempt their property from the bankruptcy estate. The case arose out of the interplay between two important rules. One imposes dollar-value limits on the extent to which a debtor can exempt certain types of property. The other requires interested parties to object to a debtor's claimed exemptions within 30 days after the conclusion of the creditors' meeting, or else lose the ability to retain any of that property for the bankruptcy estate.
The question in Schwab was, what happens when a debtor both reports an asset with an estimated market value and claims an exemption for the asset equal to the market value, the trustee does not object because the claimed exemption falls within the applicable-dollar value limit, and it later becomes apparent that the asset's true market value exceeds the claimed value and the applicable dollar-value limit? According to some lower courts, the trustee's failure to object entitled the debtor to an exemption equal to the entire market value, regardless of whether that value exceeded the limit imposed by the rules. In Schwab, however, the Supreme Court rejected that approach. According to the Court, the trustee need not have objected to the exemption to preserve the estate's ability to recover value in the asset beyond the value the debtor declared exempt. The rationale for this conclusion was that the trustee had no basis for objecting in the first place–on its face, the exemption appeared to comply with the limit imposed by the rules, and there was no way of knowing beforehand that the asset would appreciate in value beyond the limit.
The Court's analysis was somewhat complex, but an example helps to illustrate the effect of the ruling. Imagine that an individual files for Chapter 7 protection and reports an asset–in this example, office equipment–to which he assigns an estimated market value of $5,000, that he claims a $5,000 exemption for the equipment, and that the applicable dollar-value limit on office equipment exemptions is also $5,000. Given the dollar-value limit, the trustee concludes that the claimed exemption is appropriate and therefore does not object. The thirty-day objection period then passes, and a third-party appraises the equipment and assigns a market value of $8,000. Under the prior approach of some lower courts, the trustee's failure to object would have entitled the debtor to an $8,000 exemption for the equipment. But Schwab invalidates that approach and establishes that the debtor will be entitled to an office equipment exemption of $5,000, even though the true value of the equipment exceeds that amount by $3,000. The $3,000 remainder goes to the bankruptcy estate, to be distributed among the creditors.
For individuals contemplating Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the lesson of Schwab is twofold: First, even if you accurately report an asset's value and claim a valid exemption equal to that value, you cannot later capture any serendipitous increase in value beyond the limits imposed by the rules. Second, if for some reason it is important to you to exempt the full market value of an asset or the asset itself, rather than a particular monetized interest in the asset, Schwab suggests that it might be appropriate to claim an exemption for "full fair market value (FMV)" or "100% of FMV." Thus, going back to the example above, the debtor might try to claim an exemption of "100% of FMV" for his office equipment, rather than $5,000. A court could reject this claim if it later became apparent that fair market value exceeds the $5,000 limit. But Schwab also suggests that phrasing an exemption claim in this manner effectively places other parties on notice that the debtor seeks to exempt the entirety of the asset's value. If a debtor provides this notice and others nevertheless fail to object, the debtor may be able to keep a subsequent increase in market value beyond the otherwise applicable dollar limit.
Posted in 13 , Bankruptcy, Chapter 7, Chapter 7 issues, Debtors, Exempt Property, Protected property issues, a, accepts, an, and, appraises, assigns, bankruptcy exemptions, calculation, cases, chapter, claimed, court, entitled, equipment, exemption, falls, hotline, hotline , maintains, market, network, object, office, passes, planning, rarely, reilly, rejected, requires, schwab, states, supreme, the, third party, united, united states supreme court bankruptcy decision, utah, v, the | Comments Off
Sunday, July 4th, 2010
On June 7, 2010, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Hamilton, Chapter 13 Trustee v. Lanning. The Supreme Court rarely hears argument in consumer bankruptcy cases so the Lanning decision is big news to consumer bankruptcy lawyers.
The issue in Lanning is one that has troubled bankruptcy lawyers since 2005, when the "means test" was added to the Bankruptcy Code. The means test functions as a test – do you have the "means" or disposable income to fund a Chapter 13 repayment plan? If the means test shows that you do not have sufficient disposable income to make a Chapter 13 work, then you qualify for Chapter 7.
As one of the assistant United States trustees once told me – the purpose of the means test is to disqualify as many people as possible from Chapter 7, and to force them into Chapter 13.
In practice, the means test does not work very well in predicting who can make a Chapter 13 work. One of the biggest complaints has to do with the mechanical nature of means testing. To run a means test, I have to gather pay stubs from the past 6 months. I then create a monthly average, which represents available income. Next I prepare a means test budget, but I do not use actual expense amounts. Instead, the means test tells me how much my clients are allowed to spend for food, medicine, utilities, etc. And where do these budget numbers come from? Means test numbers are based on IRS budgets used in delinquent tax repayment plans. In other words, the means test budget allocations are not especially generous.
This explanation of the means test is somewhat oversimplified, but you get the main idea – every bankruptcy debtor's income and expense numbers have to be run through the means test, and not surprisingly this somewhat mechanical test produces some absurd results.
The classic example of absurd results occurs when a debtor has received a Christmas bonus or a one time payment. That bonus/one time payment has to be included in the monthly income numbers even if it is not guaranteed or likely to happen again. In other situations a debtor may have earned a comfortable income but has now lost his job – under a strict reading of the means test, he earns too much money to file Chapter 7. And he can't afford to file a Chapter 13 because he now has no income.
The Supreme Court has injected some common sense into this situation. In the Lemming case, which was filed in Topeka, Kansas, the debtor's 6 month average was skewed by a one time payment arising from a buyout from her former employer. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan that called for a payment that the debtor could afford based on her actual, current income. The trustee objected on the grounds that the means test dictated a higher number (that the debtor clearly could not afford based on his actual income).
The Topeka bankruptcy judge agreed with the debtor and approved a plan that Ms. Lemming could afford. The trustee appealed and lost in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The trustee appealed again and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and held that bankruptcy judges need not apply a "mechanical approach" to means testing in Chapter 13 cases. Instead, judges should "take into account other known or virtually known certain information about the debtor's future income or expenses." Rather than looking backwards, judges can take a forward looking approach and consider the realities of a debtor's income. This forward looking approach should be considered in cases with unusual facts and the Lemming decision should not be construed as an invalidation of the means testing formula.
Despite the Supreme Court's warning that a "forward looking" approach should only be used in limited situations, I suspect that bankruptcy judges will use "Lemming arguments" mitigate some of the harsh results of Chapter 13 in general. Bankruptcy judges recognize that Chapter 13 cases often do not work because means testing and aggressive trustee arguments force debtors to agree to plans that commit debtors to pay every last dime to the trustee. Unfortunately, family emergencies and unexpected things happen over the course of a five year bankruptcy plan and many plans will fail – not because the debtor did anything wrong, but because there is no "give" in the plan.
I predict that judges will use the rationale of Lemming to reduce some of the harsh results of the means test and help debtors improve their chances at success in Chapter 13.
If you want to read the Lemming decision, click on the link. I also found a nice summary of Lemming in attorney Jordan Bublick's fine South Florida bankruptcy blog.
Posted in 13, 2010, Chapter 13 issues, Debtors, Hamilton Chapter 13 trustee v. Lemming, Means Test issues, Trustee, Trustee objections in Chapter 13, affirmed, aggressive, and, argument, arguments, cases, certiorari the, chapter, chapter 13 plans, court, decision, facts, force, formula despite, granted, hamilton, hears, lanning , lemming, means, means testing, rarely, read, released, states, supreme, testing, the, trustee objections to chapter 13, united, unusual, v, work | Comments Off
Thursday, March 11th, 2010
Recently I met with a client who was looking into filing bankruptcy because of credit card and medical debt. Among his creditors, however, was an individual, an insurance company and fines due a local county. When I asked about this, he explained that about a year ago, he was involved in an auto accident that was his fault. He further explained that the individual sued him and that damages awarded were more than his insurance coverage, and that he also had fines because the accident occurred when he was under the influence.
He was unhappy to learn that Section 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically excepts from discharge debts arising from the "death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance."
I read this Code section to mean that my client cannot discharge:
- any damage award due to the accident victim
- restitution ordered by the local county court
- fines imposed by the local county court
What about property damage arising from this drunk driving accident. I read the Code section to limit non-dischargeability to personal injury so I do not think that property damages would be excepted here.
Washington D.C. bankruptcy lawyer Morgan Fisher wrote a post about DUI damages and bankruptcy dischargeability last year. He notes that an insurance company seeking subrogation damages (recovery of car repair payments from the negligent driver by an insurance company) could argue against dischargeability under other provisions of Section 523. I believe that Morgan is referring to Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(6) which excepts from discharge debts arising from the "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."
Morgan also notes that a local Bankruptcy Judge will look to the state law in the jurisdiction where the criminal prosecution is based to determine culpability. I suspect this means that if you are convicted of DUI in a state where the applicable blood alcohol limit is .08, but you file bankruptcy in a state where the limit is .10, you would not be able to argue that Section 523(a)(9) does not apply to you.
I would also suggest that any DUI defendant who is contemplating a plea should look carefully at the language of 523(a)(9) – how the plea is structured in state court could have a bearing on whether the debt was dischargeable. I have not seen this happen, but I would think that a Bankruptcy Judge might have to hold an evidentiary hearing if the state court DUI plea bargain did not conclusively speak to driving under the influence.
Posted in 523(a)(6), 523(a)(9), Bankruptcy, Chapter 7 issues, Creditor discharge actions, DUI and bankruptcy, DWI and bankruptcy, Insurance, Lawyer, a, accident , alcohol, an, and, applicable, bargain, blood, company, court, d c, damages, driving, drunk, dui, entity, excepted, fines, fisher, here washington, injury, limit, malicious, morgan, non-dischageability, plea, post, recovery, seeking, state, subrogation, subrogation and bankruptcy, the, willful, wrote | Comments Off
Friday, February 12th, 2010
As you probably know, there are two types of consumer bankruptcy cases available to you – a Chapter 7 which wipes out debt, and a Chapter 13 which creates a five year payment plan in which you pay back some or all of your debt with your "disposable income." When I prepare a Chapter 13 case, we work with you to create a liveable budget. The money "left over" after you pay for housing, food, transportation, insurance, utilities and other necessities must be sent to the Chapter 13 trustee, who then disburses these funds to your creditors based on a plan of reorganization that we submit to the court.
What happens if you need to file a Chapter 13, you have not yet filed your tax return for last year, but you know that a refund will be coming your way. The simple answer is that unless you are paying back your creditors at 100%, your Chapter 13 will demand that you turn over your tax refund check, and will use that money to pay your creditors. If you know that a refund is headed your way, make sure to tell your lawyer before you file – there are some steps you can take to preserve some or all of your tax refund money.
Your Chapter 13 trustee will also want future refunds paid to the trustee. This situation is easier to handle – you will want to adjust your payroll withholdings so that you do not have any refund coming. As far as the Chapter 13 trustee is concerned, your tax refund is kind of like a savings account that artificially reduces your net pay amount.
All of the Chapter 13 trustees in the Northern District of Georgia require debtors who are paying less than 100% to creditors to include in their Chapter 13 plans a provision that authorizes the IRS to intercept any refund payable during the years that your plan is in effect and send this money to the Chapter 13 trustee. And until now, the IRS has cooperated with the Chapter 13 trustees in redirecting refund money.
In January, 2010, however, a federal district court in Michigan has rules that the Chapter 13 trustee does not have the power to compel the IRS to serve as its collection agent. In the case of United States v. Carroll, a judge in the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that there is no legal basis for the IRS to withhold money and deliver it to the trustee because Congress has not waived the IRS' "sovereign immunity" that would otherwise leave the IRS vulnerable to contempt actions and other enforcement actions by the trustee (in other words, if the IRS failed to withhold a debtor's refund, the trustee would not have the right to sue the IRS for damages or for remedial action). The Michigan judge issued an order forbidding the bankruptcy courts there from confirming any Chapter 13 plan that has the income tax refund seizure language.
I would not be surprised if bankruptcy courts elsewhere in the nation begin to follow the path set by the Michigan judge. We'll know soon enough, but I suspect that the trustees in the Northern District may discontinue their demand for an income tax provision involving the IRS in Chapter 13 plans.
I do not expect, however that Chapter 13 trustees here or elsewhere in the country will permit Chapter 13 debtors from keeping large tax refunds. I suspect that trustees will still demand provisions that obligate debtors to tender their tax refunds but they will expect the debtors to send in the money, rather than having it withheld by the IRS. I will continue to advise my clients to minimize their refunds to avoid the problem entirely.
Needless to say, losing this automatic tax refund payment mechanism will make enforcement of tax refund plan provisions much more difficult. It will be interesting to what if anything Chapter 13 trustees do to address this potential administrative nightmare.
Posted in 2010, Bankruptcy, Chapter 13 issues, Chapter 13 plan calculations, Irs, Tax issues, a, an, automatic, chapter 13 plan, chapter 13 trustee, court, courts, district, enforcement, federal, forbidding, income, intercept, issued, january, judge, keeping, language i, large, losing, mechanism, michigan, money in, order, payable, payment, plan, provisions, redirecting, refund, refunds , seizure, tax, tax refunds in chapter 13, the, | Comments Off
